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The paper studies the dynamic macroeconomic effects of fiscal shocks of various duration 
(permanent and temporary) under different financing methods (lump-sum tax and government 
debt). To this end, we develop an intertemporal macroeconomic model for a small open 
economy, featuring monopolistic competition in the intermediate goods market, endogenous 
(intertemporal) labor supply, and finitely lived households. Endogenous labor supply is 
crucial in generating cyclical adjustment paths and yields faster convergence to the new 
steady state compared with exogenous labor supply. The quantitative output effects and 
transitional dynamics of fiscal policy differ substantially from those of an infinitely lived 
representative agent model. In addition, government debt is key in making the timing of 
shocks matter, thus yielding permanent output effects of temporary fiscal shocks. 
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In the wake of the New Open Economy Macroeconomics—for which Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ
(1995) laid the foundations with their ‘Redux’ model—there has been a revival of interest
in analyzing the macroeconomic eﬀects of ﬁscal policy in open economies. In contrast
to the traditional open economy models, the new models oﬀer a rigorous micro-founded
framework, which incorporates monopolistic competition, endogenous labor supply, and
some form of stickiness in wages or prices. The new approach puts a lot of emphasis on
the transitional dynamics of the current account and the nominal exchange rate. Because
of its focus on nominal variables, money plays a central role.
The present paper analyzes the dynamic macroeconomic eﬀects of ﬁscal spending
shocks in a small open economy. We develop an intertemporal optimization model, which
features monopolistic competition, endogenous intertemporal labor supply, and ﬁnitely
lived households. But our approach diﬀers from the New Keynesian sticky-price approach
by assuming fully ﬂexible prices and wages. Indeed, money does not feature in our analysis
because we are interested in the eﬀects of ﬁscal policy on relative prices. We thus focus
on real rather than nominal variables. Our small open economy is embedded in a world of
a homogeneous ﬁnal good, which is supplied under perfect competition. The ﬁnal goods
sector employs diﬀerentiated intermediate inputs that are produced under monopolistic
competition using labor and capital as primary inputs.1 In keeping with the literature,
there is an internationally traded bond, ensuring that households can use the current ac-
count to smooth private consumption. To avoid trivial capital dynamics, we postulate
adjustment costs of investment at the level of the portfolio investor.
The analysis of ﬁscal policy in open economy models has received little attention com-
pared with monetary policy. The vast majority of micro-founded literature on ﬁscal policy
assumes perfect competition. Early contributions are those by Buiter (1981) and Cardia
(1993).2 The latter, however, is the only one that speciﬁcally analyzes public spending
policy in a small open economy. Contributions that introduce some form of imperfect
competition in goods or labor markets (without imposing explicit price stickiness) are
small in number and are primarily focused on the case of a closed economy.3 A notable
1Alternatively, we could have considered a two-sector model consisting of tradables and nontradables
(as in Bruno, 1976).
2Giovannini (1988), Sen and Turnovsky (1989, 1990), and Bovenberg (1993) also employ small open
economy models but focus on tax or tariﬀ policy rather than expenditure policy. Frenkel and Razin (1987),
Buiter (1988), and Buiter and Kletzer (1991) study public spending policy but deal with large, two-country,
open economy models.
3Rotemberg and Woodford (1995), Devereux et al. (1996), Heijdra (1998), and Heijdra and Ligthart
(2007) focus on the closed economy case. The ﬁrst two papers take a stochastic real business cycle approach
whereas the latter two assume a deterministic setting.
1exception is the open economy model of Coto-Martinez and Dixon (2003) to which our
work is most closely related. They study the case of an inﬁnitely lived representative
agent (RA)—a speciﬁcation which imposes Ricardian equivalence—and therefore cannot
meaningfully diﬀerentiate between ﬁnancing methods.
The ﬁrst aim of our study is to characterize analytically the transition paths induced
by a ﬁscal impulse. To this end, we employ the Laplace transform technique (Judd, 1982).
Numerical examples are used to illustrate the transition paths at business cycle frequencies.
Our numerical results show that a rise in public spending ﬁnanced by lump-sum taxes
yields positive output multipliers both in the short and long run. Long-run multipliers are
well above unity if labor supply is suﬃciently elastic4 and exceed those in the short run.
Furthermore, a ﬁscal impulse induces a short-run trade balance deﬁcit, which swings into
surplus in the new steady state. Because the stable eigenvalues of the linearized model can
have complex values, our transition paths feature endogenously determined (dampened)
cycles. Elastic intertemporal labor supply in an overlapping generations (OLG) setting is
the key factor in generating these cycles.5 Due to this cyclical feature, time periods in
which private consumption multipliers and output multipliers move together are followed
by periods in which they move in opposite directions.
A second objective is to consider the output implications of a debt-ﬁnanced ﬁscal im-
pulse.6 We model ﬁnitely lived households in the Blanchard (1985)-Yaari (1965) tradition,
which gives rise to the failure of Ricardian equivalence. In this context, debt ﬁnancing
diﬀers from lump-sum tax ﬁnancing in its eﬀect on output and the other macroeconomic
variables. In addition, it makes the timing of taxes and public spending matter and thus
aﬀects the transitional dynamics.7 We study shocks of various duration (temporary and
permanent), types of ﬁnancing (pure lump-sum taxes versus public debt) and impulse sizes
(moderate and drastic). Because of debt ﬁnancing, temporary shocks have permanent ef-
fects on macroeconomic variables. Not surprisingly, output multipliers of temporary ﬁscal
shocks are shown to be smaller than those of permanent shocks.
Besides providing a meaningful role to debt ﬁnancing, ﬁnitely lived households yield
an endogenously determined, stationary steady state. It is well known that in RA models
of a small open economy the steady state is hysteretic. The dynamic system contains a
zero root if the ﬁxed world rate of interest equals the pure rate of time preference. This
knife-edge condition should hold for a steady state to exist. If the rate of interest ex-
4Elastic labor supply is needed to generate non-zero output eﬀects in the steady state.
5In a closed-economy OLG setting, however, Heijdra and Ligthart (2007) derive monotonic transition
paths.
6Ganelli (2006) also considers debt ﬁnancing, but employs a variant of the sticky-price Redux model,
which does not yield cyclical dynamics.
7The output multipliers are ‘balanced budget’ under lump-sum taxation. Bond ﬁnancing permits tem-
porary budget imbalances as long as the government’s solvency condition is met.
2ceeds (falls short of) the pure rate of time preference, households permanently accumulate
(deplete) foreign assets. Various other authors have employed OLG as a stationarity in-
ducing device.8 None of these authors, however, has compared the comparative dynamic
properties of OLG models with those of RA models. In a closed economy context, output
multipliers of ﬁscal policy in OLG and RA models do not diﬀer much (see Heijdra and
Ligthart, 2007). Moreover, the business cycle properties of both models are similar in a
stochastic setting (see Rios-Rull, 1996 and Gomme et al., 2005). In a small open economy
context, results are dramatically diﬀerent; the long-run output eﬀects of ﬁscal policy in the
RA model are substantially larger than in the OLG model. Furthermore, the benchmark
OLG model yields cyclical transitional dynamics against a monotonic transition in the
RA model. Introducing OLG in open economy models is not just a stationarity-inducing
device, but also aﬀects the quantitative and cyclical properties of ﬁscal shocks.9
Unlike the vast majority of new open economy models—which assumes a ﬁxed number
of ﬁrms—we allow for free entry and exit of ﬁrms.10 Endogenizing the number of ﬁrms
in the intermediate goods sector gives rise to policy induced Ethier-productivity eﬀects,
which increase the size of Keynesian output multipliers. Our numerical results show that
more elastic labor supply magniﬁes the long-run output eﬀects of a rise in public spending.
In addition, the speed of convergence to the new steady state rises if labor supply becomes
more elastic and the preference for diversity increases.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 sets out the extended Blanchard-Yaari
model for a small open economy. Section 3 studies model stability, the analytical transition
paths, and calibration issues. Section 4 analyzes the dynamics of both a permanent and
temporary increase in public consumption under various ﬁnancing methods. Section 5
studies the robustness of the results to alternative parameterizations. In addition, we
compare our results with the RA case, which is the standard in the literature. Section 6
summarizes and concludes.
8Authors use various speciﬁcations of OLG. Giovannini (1988), Bovenberg (1993), and Cardia (1993)
also use the Blanchard-Yaari framework. Buiter (1981) and Buiter and Kletzer (1991) employ a life-cycle
OLG model. Cavallo and Ghironi (2002) employ the Weil speciﬁcation, which allows for OLG of inﬁnitely
lived agents (featuring population growth). See Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2003) for an overview alternative
stationarity-inducing devices.
9Note that the OLG framework, in contrast to the RA model, allows for an analysis of the intergener-
ational distribution eﬀects of policies. Such an analysis is beyond the scope of this paper.
10The papers by Ghironi and Melitz (2005), who analyze the eﬀects of ﬁrm entry and exit on trading
patterns, and Coto-Martinez and Dixon (2003) are notable exceptions.
32 The Model of Perpetual Youth
In this section, we develop a dynamic, micro-founded, macroeconomic model for a small
open economy, which features forward-looking agents. Subsequently, we discuss decision
making by households, ﬁrms, and the government.
2.1 Households
The household section of the model builds on Blanchard (1985) and the extension to en-
dogenous intertemporal labor supply by Heijdra and Ligthart (2007). The model features
a ﬁxed population of agents (normalized to unity) each facing a constant probability of
death (β ≥ 0), which equals the rate at which new agents are born. Labor is assumed
to be immobile internationally and is supplied in a perfectly competitive labor market.
Households do not leave bequests—implying that generations are disconnected—and do
not face liquidity constraints.
Consumption Decision During their entire life agents have a time endowment of unity,
which they allocate to labor and leisure. The utility functional at time t of the represen-
tative agent born at time v is assumed to be weakly separable in private consumption,




[εC lnC(v,τ) + (1 − εC)ln(1 − L(v,τ))]e(α+β)(t−τ)dτ, α > 0, (1)
where α is the pure rate of time preference and εC is the share of private consumption in
utility (where 0 < εC < 1). The agent’s budget identity is:
˙ A(v,t) = (r + β)A(v,t) + w(t)L(v,t) − T(t) − C(v,t), (2)
where an overdot indicates a time derivative, A(v,t) are ﬁnancial assets, r is the ﬁxed
world rate of interest, w(t) is the (age-independent) wage rate,11 and T(t) are net lump-
sum taxes (all denoted in real terms).
The household chooses a time proﬁle for C(v,t) and L(v,t) to maximize Λ(v,t) subject
to its budget identity (2) and a no-Ponzi-game (NPG) solvency condition. A household’s
optimal time proﬁle of private consumption is described by the Euler equation:
˙ C(v,t)
C(v,t)
= r − α. (3)
11Despite the constant rate of interest, wages are ﬂexible, reﬂecting adjustment costs in investments (see
below).
4In the general case, we study a patient nation, that is, r > α, which yields rising individual
consumption proﬁles.12 Labor supply is negatively linked to private consumption (i.e., the
wealth eﬀect) and positively associated with wages:




Aggregate variables can be calculated as the weighted sum of the values for diﬀerent
generations. Aggregate ﬁnancial wealth is, for example, A(t) ≡
R t
−∞ A(v,t)βeβ(v−t)dv.
The aggregate values of the other variables can be derived in a similar fashion. By aggre-
gating (3), we arrive at the aggregate Euler equation:
˙ C(t)
C(t)












Equation (5) has the same form as the Euler equation for individual households (3), except
for a correction term, which represents the wealth redistribution caused by the turnover
of generations. Optimal individual consumption growth is the same for all generations
since they face the same rate of interest. But old generations have a higher consumption
level than young generations because they are wealthier. Since existing generations are
continually being replaced by newborns, who are born without ﬁnancial wealth, aggre-
gate consumption growth falls short of individual consumption growth. The correction
term appearing in (5) thus represents the diﬀerence in average consumption, C(t), and
consumption by newborns, C(t,t).13
Investment Decision There are three assets in the economy, that is, claims on domes-
tic capital goods, V (t), domestic government bonds, B(t), and net foreign assets, F(t),
which are all measured in real terms. By assuming assets to be perfect substitutes in the
household’s portfolio, they earn the same real rate of return.








where rK(t) is the rental rate on capital and I(t) denotes gross investment. We follow
Uzawa (1969) by postulating a concave accumulation function, Ψ(·), which links net capital
12Rising individual consumption proﬁles imply a positive stock of ﬁnancial assets in the initial equilib-
rium. By using (5) in steady state, we arrive at (r−α) ˆ C = βεC(α+β) ˆ A, where hats indicate steady-state
values of variables. For β > 0 and r − α > 0, we ﬁnd ˆ A > 0. As a special case, which we refer to as
modiﬁed OLG, we study ﬂat individual consumption proﬁles (i.e., r − α = 0), which implies ˆ A = 0. See
Footnote 27.
13We use the fact that C(t) = εC(α + β)[A(t) + H(t)] and C(t,t) = εC(α + β)H(t), where H(t)
is ‘full’ human wealth, that is, the after-tax value of the household’s time endowment: H(t) ≡
R ∞
t [w(τ) − T(τ)]e
−(r+β)τdτ.










K(t), Ψ(0) = 0, Ψ0(·) > 0, Ψ00(·) < 0, (7)
where δ > 0 is the constant rate of capital depreciation.
The household-investor chooses paths for gross investment and the capital stock to
maximize (6) subject to (7) and taking as given the initial capital stock, K(0) = 0, and


















where q(t) denotes Tobin’s q, which measures the market value of capital relative to its re-
placement costs. The degree of physical capital mobility is given by σ ≡ −(I/K)(Ψ00/Ψ0) >
0, where a small σ characterizes a high degree of capital mobility. Without adjustment
costs (i.e., σ = 0) we have Ψ(·) = I(t)/K(t), which implies q = 1 (from (8)). In this
case, q(t) and K(t) adjust instantaneously to their steady-state levels, reﬂecting an inﬁ-
nite rate of investment in an inﬁnitesimal small time period. Consequently, (9) reduces to
rK = r + δ, which is the familiar rental rate derived in a static framework.
2.2 Firms
Following Hornstein (1993), the ﬁrm sector consists of: (i) monopolistically competitive
ﬁrms, each of which produces a unique variety of an intermediate input; and (ii) perfectly
competitive ﬁrms, producing a homogeneous ﬁnal output using intermediate goods.
Homogeneous Final Goods Technology in the ﬁnal goods sector can be described by
a Dixit-Stiglitz (1977) speciﬁcation:





, η ≥ 1, µ > 1, (10)
where Y (t) denotes aggregate output of ﬁnal goods, Zi(t) is the quantity of variety i of the
diﬀerentiated intermediate good, and N(t) is the number of input varieties. The parameter
η regulates the productivity eﬀect of increased input variety and µ is the markup set by
ﬁrms in the intermediate goods sector.14 Equation (10) shows the production function
of the ﬁnal goods sector, which implies external economies of scale for η > 1, owing to
14In contrast to most of the literature, we parameterize separately the diversity eﬀect, η, and the price
elasticity of input demand, µ/(1 − µ). See Ethier (1982) and B´ enassy (1996).
6increasing input diversity (see Ethier, 1982). External economies of scale thus only become
eﬀective if the number of ﬁrms is allowed to change.
The representative producer in the ﬁnal goods sector minimizes the cost of producing a
given quantity of ﬁnal goods by choosing the optimal mix of input varieties. Input demand
functions feature a constant elasticity of demand:














Diﬀerentiated Intermediate Goods The intermediate goods sector features N(t)
monopolistically competitive ﬁrms, each of which produces a single diﬀerentiated input.
Each ﬁrm i rents capital and labor from the household sector to produce gross output
according to:
Zi(t) + f ≡ Li(t)εLKi(t)1−εL, 0 < εL < 1, (13)
where f are ﬁxed costs modeled in terms of the output of ﬁrm i. The ﬁrm’s cost function
is:
Γi(t) ≡ γ0w(t)εL 
rK(t)




εL(1 − εL)1−εL−1 > 0. Firms maximize proﬁts by choosing their price and
factor demands subject to (11) and (14). As a result, the price of input variety i is set













where ρi(t) measures (local) internal increasing returns to scale due to the existence of ﬁxed
costs. Furthermore, the factor demands by ﬁrm i are determined by the usual marginal
productivity conditions for labor and capital, ∂Zi(t)/∂Li(t) = µw(t) and ∂Zi(t)/∂Ki(t) =
µrK(t), which both feature the ﬁrm’s markup.
We assume Chamberlinian monopolistic competition, implying that the instantaneous
entry and exit of ﬁrms eliminates all excess proﬁts. Accordingly, the intermediate input





7By combining (15) and (16), we obtain µ = ρi, which implies a constant equilibrium





, where µ > 1 for the
equilibrium to exist. If µ → 1 and f → 0 the model converges to a perfectly competitive
economy.
2.3 Government and Foreign Sector
Government spending neither yields utility to individuals nor is it productive. Public
consumption is ﬁnanced by lump-sum taxes or a combination of lump-sum taxes and
debt. The government’s periodic budget identity is given by:
˙ B(t) = rB(t) + G(t) − T(t), (17)
where G(t)−T(t) denotes the primary ﬁscal deﬁcit. Because the government must remain
solvent, the government budget identity can be integrated forward—while using its NPG




[T(τ) − G(τ)]er(t−τ)dτ. (18)
Equation (18) says that the present value of current and future primary surpluses must
equal the public debt level.
In the non-degenerate case, households use the current account to smooth consumption
(and thus acquire net foreign assets, F(t)). Foreign ﬁnancial capital is perfectly mobile.
The change in net foreign assets equals the current account balance:
˙ F(t) = rF(t) + [Y (t) − C(t) − I(t) − G(t)], (19)
where the term in square brackets is the trade account, showing that domestic output
less domestic absorption, C(t) + I(t) + G(t), equals net exports, X(t). National solvency
requires: F(t) = −
R ∞
t X(τ)er(t−τ)dτ, showing that the pre-existing level of net foreign
assets (debt) should equal the present value of trade balance deﬁcits (surpluses).
2.4 Symmetric Perfect Foresight Equilibrium
The supply side of the model is symmetric and can thus be expressed in aggregate terms.
All existing ﬁrms in the intermediate goods sector are of equal size, ¯ Z, and thus charge
the same price and demand the same amounts of capital and labor, that is, Ki(t) = ¯ K(t)
and Li(t) = ¯ L(t). Equation (10) yields an expression for an aggregate quantity index for
production in the ﬁnal goods sector, that is, Y (t) = N(t)η ¯ Z. Hence, aggregate output of
ﬁnal goods is an iso-elastic function of the number of input varieties, N(t). Production
of intermediate goods can be expressed in aggregate terms, using K(t) ≡ N(t) ¯ K(t) and
8L(t) ≡ N(t)¯ L(t), and subsequently be used to derive aggregate ﬁnal output, Y (t) =
Ω0L(t)ηεLK(t)η(1−εL), where Ω0 is a productivity parameter and η serves as the returns
to scale parameter.
The stock market value of the ﬁrm, V (t), equals q(t)K(t). Accordingly, portfolio
equilibrium amounts to A(t) = V (t)+B(t)+F(t). In case of r > α, we assume that there
are no domestic government liabilities and no net foreign assets in the initial steady state
(i.e., B(0) = F(0) = 0).
3 Solving the Loglinearized System
This section solves the model, derives the analytical impulse responses to ﬁscal shocks,
and discusses calibration issues. Both the general case of OLG and the special case of RA
are analyzed.
3.1 Stability Analysis
The local stability of the model is analyzed by loglinearizing it around an initial steady
state. A tilde (˜) denotes a relative change, for example, ˜ C(t) ≡ dC(t)/C, for most
variables (Appendix A.1). Appendix Table 1 provides a summary of the loglinearized
model. The dynamics of the model can be summarized by two predetermined variables
(i.e., the physical capital stock and ﬁnancial assets) and two non-predetermined variables

















































(1 − εL) ¯ y[1 − ηφ(1 − εL)] r (1 − εL) ¯ y (φ − 1) 0
0 0 r − α −r−α
ωA






where ¯ y ≡ Y/qK, ωA ≡ r/¯ y, ωC ≡ C/Y, ωI ≡ I/Y , ωT ≡ T/Y , γA(t) = rωT ˜ T(t) is




1 + θL(1 − ηεL)
≥ 1, (21)
15The government bond path will be discussed in Section 3.2.
9where θL ≡ (1 − L)/L ≥ 0 is the ratio of leisure to labor (which equals the intertemporal
elasticity of substitution in labor supply). Assumption 1 guarantees a positive denominator
of (21), 1 + θL(1 − ηεL) > 0, so that φ is positive and greater than unity for endogenous
labor supply. If ηεL > 1, labor demand is upward sloping16 and θL has a vertical asymptote
at 1/(ηεL − 1). Intuitively, Assumption 1 ensures that the labor supply curve is steeper
(with respect to the wage axis) than the labor demand curve.
Assumption 1 If ηεL > 1, we assume that 0 ≤ θL < ˆ φ ≡ 1/(ηεL − 1).
Depending on the magnitude of φ, three labor supply cases can be distinguished of which
the ﬁrst two are consistent with saddle-point stability: (i) inelastic, φ = 1; (ii) moderately
elastic, 1 < φ < ¯ φ ≡ 1/(η(1 − εL)); and (iii) highly elastic, φ > ¯ φ.
The dynamics of the OLG system depends crucially on the intertemporal labor supply
elasticity. For θL = 0, equation (21) yields φ = 1, implying exogenous labor supply. In that
case, δ23 = 0 (from (20)), which yields a recursive investment system (˜ q(t), ˜ K(t)) that can
be solved completely independently from the savings system ( ˜ C(t), ˜ A(t)). The investment
and savings systems are saddle-path stable, giving rise to a monotonic transition to the
new steady state after a ﬁscal policy shock. For θL > 0 and thus φ > 1 the investment
system is non-recursive because δ23 > 0. Two negative and two positive roots (potentially
complex valued) result if 1 < φ < ¯ φ ≡ 1/(η(1 − εL)) whereas all roots are complex
if φ > ¯ φ.17 In the complex case, the analytical solution for the transition paths of the
variables includes cosine and sine terms (Appendix A.2 and Section 3.3), which give rise to
endogenously determined cycles. Proposition 1 summarizes the local stability properties
of the system.
Proposition 1 If φ ∈ [0, ¯ φ), the OLG system (β > 0) has a unique and saddle-path stable
steady state, which features four characteristic roots with two negative real parts and two
positive real parts.
Proof See Appendix A.2 and Heijdra and Ligthart (2006).
Our model nests the RA case in which β = 0 so that r = α is required for a hysteretic
steady state to exist. The model does not have a steady state unless r = α, which yields
perfect consumption smoothing. Notice that the economy would keep accumulating assets
16This can be seen by substituting (AT1.10) from Appendix Table 1 into (AT1.6), which yields an
expression for the wage rate as a function of employment and the capital stock: ˜ w(t) = (ηεL − 1)˜ L(t) +
η(1 − εL) ˜ K(t).
17The case of φ = ¯ φ yields an investment system with one zero root and one positive root. If intertemporal
labor supply is suﬃciently elastic (i.e., θL is large and thus φ > ¯ φ), all the real parts of complex roots may
plausibly turn positive, thus yielding an unstable solution. See Appendix A.2.
10if r > α18 or be depleting assets if r < α. In the RA case, the rate of growth of aggregate
consumption does not depend on the holdings of ﬁnancial assets. Mathematically, in terms
of the Jacobian matrix, we have δ33 = δ34 = 0 (i.e., the third row of ∆ consists of zeros),
yielding a singular Jacobian matrix.19 Thus, the RA model introduces a zero root in
private consumption and labor supply, making the steady state dependent on the initial
stock of foreign assets. Provided labor supply is elastic (φ > 1 so that δ23 > 0) there is
also hysteresis in the physical capital stock and all variables dependent on it.20
Proposition 2 The RA model (imposing β = 0 and r = α) features a hysteretic steady
state. To guarantee saddle-point stability, it is required that ηφ(1 − εL) < 1. The four
characteristic roots are real: h∗
1 = 0, −h∗
2 = (r −
√
r2 + 4δ12δ21)/2, r∗





Proof See Heijdra and Ligthart (2006).
3.2 Fiscal Policy Paths
The path of the public spending impulse in its most general form can be postulated as
follows:
˜ G(t) = ˜ Ge−ξGt, ξG ≥ 0, (22)
where ξG denotes the adjustment speed of public consumption. A permanent ﬁscal change
is represented by ξG = 0 and 0 < ξG  ∞ models a temporary ﬁscal shock. Larger values
of ξG generate a lower degree of shock persistence.
Under pure lump-sum tax ﬁnancing of a ﬁscal impulse, we set ˜ T (t) = ˜ G(t) for all
t ≥ 0. For deﬁcit ﬁnancing, however, the paths for ˜ G(t) and ˜ T (t) do not coincide and we
postulate:




, ξT > 0, (23)
where ξT is the adjustment speed of lump-sum taxes and ˜ T0 > 0 if there is an initial
tax cut. Using the government budget identity (17), the government solvency condition
can be written as L{˜ T,r} = L{ ˜ G,r}, where L denotes the Laplace transform operator.21
18In an RA model, r > α is not a viable interior solution because the economy would cease being small
in world capital markets.
19The steady state is well deﬁned because the number of non-predetermined variables equals the number
of eigenvalues with strictly positive real parts (Giavazzi and Wyplosz, 1985).
20In their analysis of the current account eﬀects of tariﬀ policy, Sen and Turnovsky (1990) also ﬁnd
hysteresis in the capital stock.
21L{G,s} is the Laplace transformation of G(t) evaluated at s, which is given by L{G,s} ≡
R ∞
0 G(t)e
−stdt. Intuitively, L{G,s} represents the present value of G(t) using s as the discount rate.
See Heijdra and Ligthart (2006) for the derivation of equations (24)-(27).
11Government solvency implies that the long-run increase in lump-sum taxes is ˜ T(∞) =









˜ G + ˜ T0

, ξT > 0. (24)
Long-run lump-sum taxes must rise to cover the additional government spending on goods
plus the interest payments on the public debt that is accumulated during the transition
period. Accordingly, future generations face a larger lump-sum tax burden than present
generations.
The path for government debt can be written:



















where ωG is the output share of public spending. Using (23) and (24), the corresponding
path for lump-sum taxes can be derived:
˜ T(t) = π0 + π1e−ξTt, (26)

























which depend on the parameters ˜ G, ˜ T0, ξG, and ξT and the ﬁxed rate of interest.
3.3 Analytical Impulse Responses
A key contribution of our work is that we characterize analytically the transition paths
induced by a ﬁscal shock.22 For this purpose, we have employed the Laplace transform
technique. We focus on the case of complex roots, which are deﬁned as follows. The two
stable characteristic roots come in conjugate pairs and are denoted by ν = −h∗ +θνi and
¯ ν = −h∗ − θνi, where −h∗ < 0 is the negative real part, θk is the imaginary part for
k = {ν,λ}, and i ≡
√
−1 is the imaginary unit. The two unstable roots are λ = r∗ + θλi
and ¯ λ = r∗ − θλi, where r∗ > 0 is the positive real part.
The transition path for the capital stock is:











22Appendix A.3 sets out the solution procedure and Appendix A.4 shows the transition paths for the
remaining variables.
12where π0 and π1 are deﬁned in (27), δij is deﬁned in (20), and T1 (h∗,θν,t) and A(h∗,ξT,θν,t)
are a temporary transition term (Deﬁnition 1) and a general adjustment term (Deﬁnition
2), respectively. Deﬁnitions 1 and 2 show that the transition terms consist of exponential
functions weighted by functions that generate periodic cycles.





which has properties: (i) T1 (h∗,θν,0) = 0; and (ii) limt→∞ T1 (h∗,θν,t) = 0.






















and (iii) limt→∞ A(h∗,ξT,θν,t) = 0 for ξT > 0.
The bracketed term in (28) drops out for exogenous labor supply (i.e., δ23 = 0) or for
inﬁnitely lived representative households (i.e., δ34 = 0) or both. In addition, the cosine
and sine terms disappear from the transition terms for these cases.23 In this context, the
adjustment speed to the new steady state is driven by h∗. More generally, the cyclical part
of the OLG model with elastic labor supply is quantitatively dominated by the exponential
function unless h∗ → 0 (Deﬁnitions 1 and 2). In view of this, there is no hope that the
periodicity of cycles would match evidence from business cycle research (see Cooley and
Prescott, 1995).
3.4 Calibration
To study the quantitative signiﬁcance of the comparative dynamics, a numerical treatment
is pursued here. The model is calibrated for a plausible set of parameters.
In the benchmark model of moderately elastic labor supply (i.e., θL = 2 so that
φ = 2.27 < ¯ φ = 2.78) the parameters are the following. The world rate of interest is set
to 4 percent a year. By assuming a probability of death (β) of 2 percent, agents have an
expected life span of 50 time periods. The output share of labor income (εL) is set equal
to 0.70, which corresponds roughly to the value found for EU countries. Preference for
diversity (η) is 1.2, giving rise to ηεL = 0.84, implying diminishing returns to aggregate
23The cyclical terms also drop out from the OLG model if θL is suﬃciently low such that the stable
roots are real and distinct. See Heijdra and Ligthart (2006) for a derivation of the expressions.
13capital accumulation. The rate of capital depreciation (δ) is assumed to be 7 percent a
year. We have chosen a logarithmic speciﬁcation for the installation function:24
Ψ(x) ≡ ¯ z ln





where ¯ z is an exogenous constant and x = I/K = 0.08. From (29), we can derive,
σ = x/(x + ¯ z), which features an asymptote at x = −¯ z. We have set ¯ z = 0.268, implying
steady-state adjustment costs of 11.2 percent. Government spending as share of GDP
(ωG) is 20 percent, which equals the lump-sum tax-to-GDP share.
Once the parameters are set, all other information on output shares, Tobin’s q, and the
investment-capital ratio can be derived.25 The pure rate of time preference (α) is used as
a calibration parameter, which—given the ﬁxed rate of interest—yields rising individual
consumption proﬁles. In the benchmark case, the four characteristic roots are complex
valued. The two stable roots are ν, ¯ ν = −0.0410±0.0216i and the unstable roots are given
by λ, ¯ λ = 0.0818 ± 0.0222i.
4 The Macroeconomic Eﬀects of Fiscal Policy
This section studies numerically—using the expressions for the impulse response functions
of the previous section—unanticipated shocks in ﬁscal spending (i.e., ˜ G = 0.10) under var-
ious ﬁscal regimes: (i) lump-sum tax ﬁnancing versus bond ﬁnancing; and (ii) permanent
changes versus temporary changes. The benchmark parameter values are employed for
the OLG case. The next section studies alternative parameterizations and the RA case.
Table 1 summarizes the numerical results for the impact eﬀect (recorded at t = 0) and
the long-run eﬀect (taken at t → ∞), which will be discussed below.
4.1 Lump-Sum Tax Financing
Permanent Shocks Under pure lump-sum tax ﬁnancing of a permanent and unantici-
pated increase in public spending, we set ξG = 0 in (22), and ˜ T (t) = ˜ G for all t ≥ 0. The
impulse-response diagrams (Figure 1)—plotted for 200 time periods—show non-monotonic
transition paths for the key variables, reﬂecting the cyclical dynamics induced by endoge-
nous labor supply. The key macroeconomic linkages over time are as follows. On impact,
private consumption is crowded out by public consumption owing to the rise in lump-sum
taxes. Consequently, households supply more labor (via the negative wealth eﬀect in labor
24It is easy to see that lim¯ z→∞ Ψ(x) = x, that is, the installation function is linear (and adjustment
costs are zero) for large ¯ z.
25Equation (7) and (8) are solved, using (29), to yield (ˆ I/ ˆ K) = ¯ z [exp(δ/¯ z) − 1] and ˆ q = exp(δ/¯ z).
14supply), which pushes down wages in the short run. Given the constant capital stock in
the initial period, the capital-labor ratio falls and output rises.
The upward jump in Tobin’s q induces private investment, which increases the physical
capital stock over time and pushes up the capital-labor ratio. Close to period 45, the
change in Tobin’s q turns negative, causing a fall in the increment of the capital stock.
Subsequently, Tobin’s q slowly increases to the new steady state, where it is back at its old
equilibrium value. Because capital and employment are modeled as cooperative factors of
production, the path of employment mimics that of the capital stock. In the new steady
state, wages have risen, reﬂecting the rise in the capital-labor ratio.26 The long-run output
eﬀect of the ﬁscal impulse is clearly positive and exceeds its short-run impact. Relative
changes in output and private consumption move together in the medium run, but move
in opposite directions in the very short run and beyond period 40.
What is the eﬀect of the ﬁscal shock on the foreign sector? The combined increase in
investment and public spending exceeds the fall in private consumption thereby boosting
domestic absorption. The latter exceeds the output increase in the short run, turning the
trade account into deﬁcit. Accordingly, net foreign debt is accumulated—and thus leads
to interest payments to the rest of the world—which reaches its maximum increment in
period 30 after which somewhat of a recovery materializes. Because the trade account
swings into surplus (around period 15), foreign debt accumulation slows down. In the new
steady state, the current account is balanced again, reﬂecting a trade balance surplus that
oﬀsets interest payments on foreign debt.
Temporary Shocks To generate a temporary ﬁscal shock, we set ˜ G = ˜ T and ξG = 0.10
(see (22)), which generates a substantial degree of persistence in public spending. In the
short run, permanent and temporary ﬁscal shocks have qualitatively similar eﬀects, but
diﬀer quantitatively. Column (3) of Table 1 presents numerical evidence. The impact
eﬀects on output and the trade balance fall short of those induced by a permanent ﬁscal
impulse (compare columns (3) and (4)). It is well know that temporary ﬁscal shocks
cannot have permanent eﬀects on any of the macroeconomic variables under lump-sum
taxation. This does not mean that nothing happens after the impact period. Simulations
over the entire frequency domain—not shown in the table—indicate that the initial rise in
output is gradually oﬀset, causing output to return to its old steady state. Similarly, the
trade account swings into deﬁcit before it balances at its initial equilibrium level. Thus,
the steady-state stock of foreign assets is unaﬀected.
26The capital-labor ratio also shows a cycle. Without Ethier eﬀects, however, the long-run capital-labor
ratio would be unaﬀected.
154.2 Bond Financing
Under bond ﬁnancing of a rise in public spending, we set ξT = 0.10 in (26). Besides a
scenario of moderate ﬁscal policy, we analyze drastic ﬁscal policy, in which initial lump-
sum taxes are cut together with ˜ G > 0.
Permanent Shocks Let us ﬁrst consider a scenario of moderate ﬁscal policy, in which
initial lump-sum taxes are not changed (i.e., ˜ T0 = 0). Compared with pure lump-sum
tax ﬁnancing, the qualitative eﬀects on the new steady state are very similar (compare
columns (4) and (7)). Quantitatively, there are important diﬀerences. The long-run out-
put multipliers under debt ﬁnancing are larger than in the lump-sum tax funding regime,
because debt and the associated debt-service payments shift the lump-sum tax burden
from present to future generations. Intuitively, the higher tax burden faced by future gen-
erations induces them to work harder to make up for the fall in human wealth. Indeed, we
see a larger fall in long-run private consumption in the debt-ﬁnancing scenario. In addi-
tion, investment is much higher, reﬂecting capital accumulation induced by the expansion
of employment. Clearly, bond ﬁnancing induces bigger swings in the trade account; larger
initial trade deﬁcits—caused by demand by the investment sector and the government—
are compensated by larger future surpluses. In the short run, however, output multipliers
under lump-sum tax ﬁnancing exceed those under debt ﬁnancing, reﬂecting the tax shift
to the future.
Drastic ﬁscal policy combines a ﬁscal impulse with an initial cut in lump-sum taxes
(i.e., ˜ T0 = 0.10). Column (8) of Table 1 shows that long-run output multipliers in this
scenario are much larger than under moderate ﬁscal policy (compare columns (7) and
(8)). Drastic ﬁscal policy tilts the slope of the transition path such that the initial output
eﬀect is smaller and the ﬁnal output change is larger than under moderate ﬁscal policy.
Intuitively, the cut in initial lump-sum taxes moderates the net rise in lump-sum taxes
and thus its short-run labor supply eﬀect. In the long run, a larger amount of debt has
to be redeemed, which raises labor supply by more. Because the fall in short-run private
consumption is smaller under bond ﬁnancing, the initial trade account deﬁcit is also larger.
In the long run, a larger trade account surplus is needed to meet the national solvency
condition.
Temporary Shocks Figure 2 shows the impulse responses of a temporary debt-ﬁnanced
spending impulse. It is evident from the path of output that a temporary ﬁscal shock has a
permanent eﬀect on long-run output. In contrast, under lump-sum tax ﬁnancing, tempo-
rary shocks do not aﬀect output permanently (compare columns (3) and (5)). Permanent
eﬀects materialize themselves through the government’s intertemporal budget constraint.
16The government issues debt to balance its budget, which shifts lump-sum tax payments—
and their corresponding wealth eﬀect on labor supply—beyond the time frame of the ﬁscal
policy shock. Note that the relationship between output and consumption multipliers is
negative across the short- and medium-run time proﬁle.
Just like under permanent shocks, the size of the long-run output change is sensitive
to the size of the ﬁscal impulse; the debt-cum-tax-cut package yields the largest output
gain in the long run. It can even generate a long-run output multiplier exceeding unity.
As we saw before, a ﬁscal impulse combined with an initial lump-sum tax cut produces a
smaller short-run output gain than without a tax cut.
5 Alternative Parameterizations
In this section we study the sensitivity of the allocation results and convergence speed to
parameter changes. To keep matters simple, we consider unanticipated changes in public
spending ﬁnanced by lump-sum taxes.
5.1 Representative Agents (β = 0)
For purposes of comparison with the literature, we study the case of a zero birth rate,
which yields an inﬁnitely lived RA model. In an RA framework, Ricardian equivalence
holds, implying that the diﬀerence between lump-sum tax and debt ﬁnancing is immate-
rial. In such framework, the knife-edge condition r = α yields ﬂat private consumption
proﬁles. Consequently, the steady state is hysteretic, implying that it depends on the
initial conditions. To guarantee saddle-point stability, ηφ(1 − εL) < 1 (Proposition 2),
requiring that the degree of monopolistic competition and the intertemporal labor supply
eﬀect cannot be too large. Real Business Cycle (RBC) theorists, however, purposefully
set θL large to be able to generate business cycles. See, for example, Prescott (2006).
The qualitative impact and long-run output eﬀects of permanent ﬁscal policy in the
RA model are similar to those in the OLG model (compare columns (2) and (4) of Table
1). The quantitative eﬀects diﬀer, however. But Table 1 does not provide a proper basis of
comparison given that the slopes of the individual consumption proﬁles diﬀer (which are
upward sloping in the OLG case and ﬂat in the RA case). To address this shortcoming,
we compare the two models with the restriction r = α imposed on the OLG model (Table
2).27 We call the latter the modiﬁed OLG case. Because of the knife-edge property r = α,
the RA model is likely to be highly nonlinear. Indeed, we need to pick a β close to zero (for
example, β = 0.00001) in the modiﬁed OLG model to generate short-run output eﬀects
27The restriction r = α imposed on the OLG model implies ˆ A = 0 and − ˆ F = ˆ q ˆ K in the steady state.
Equation (AT1.3) now reduces to ˙ ˜ C(t) = δ34 ˜ A(t), where δ34 ≡ βεC (α + β)/(αωC).
17that approximate those found in the RA model. Labor supply plays a key role in causing
nonlinearities. We can illustrate this, by comparing the rows β = 0 and β = 0.01 of Table
2. For θL = 2, the short-run output multiplier declines by 9.8 percent when β rises by
0.01 compared with only a fall in the multiplier of 0.5 percent at θL = 0.5.
Recall that the long-run output multipliers in the OLG framework are unaﬀected
by the probability of death, but diﬀer from those found in an RA framework. We can
see that in the benchmark RA case long-run output multipliers exceed unity28 and are
substantially larger (by 40.6 percent) than those found in the OLG framework. In contrast,
Heijdra and Ligthart (2007)—employing closed-economy OLG and RA models—ﬁnd that
the quantitative results for the two types of models do not diﬀer much. In sum, this casts
doubts about the often assumed approximate validity of RA models for more complex
OLG cases (see Bernheim, 1987), speciﬁcally if θL is large.
The OLG structure may also give rise to diﬀering properties of the transition path
induced by a shock. Indeed, transitional dynamics in the RA model are non-cyclical
against the case of cycles in the benchmark OLG model. In fact, for the benchmark
parametrization, we ﬁnd a monotonic transition path. Note that cycles are parameter
speciﬁc. Glancing over the OLG rows in Table 2 (for the benchmark θL) shows that for
small and large values of β, the roots of the characteristic equation are real rather than
complex, implying a monotonic transition in the capital stock. Intermediate values of β
yield cycles, however. Moreover, the consumption-output correlation in the RA model is
zero across the entire time proﬁle, against a medium-run comovement of both variables in
the OLG case. In a deterministic setting, the cyclical properties make a diﬀerence, which
is not necessarily true in a stochastic RBC environment. For example, Rios-Rull (1996)
shows that the business cycle implications—in terms of the ﬁrst moments of variables and
correlations between variables—of a life-cycle model calibrated for the US economy are
similar to those found in a standard RA model.
Because of the hysteretic property, after a temporary ﬁscal shock the economy does not
return to its initial steady state. Temporary shocks can thus have permanent eﬀects even
under lump-sum tax ﬁnancing (see column (1) of Table 1). Long-run output multipliers of
temporary shocks are smaller than unity, a result which is also found in a closed economy
setting.
28In contrast to our RA results, Coto-Martinez and Dixon (2003) ﬁnd in their RA model long-run output
multipliers that are: (i) between zero and unity; and (ii) smaller than short-run output multipliers. Their
modeling framework is very diﬀerent from ours by allowing for non-separable preferences over consumption
and leisure and by not incorporating Ethier productivity eﬀects.
185.2 Overlapping Generations (β > 0)
Tables 3 and 4 report the sensitivity of long-run and short-run output multipliers in
the OLG model to changes in the intertemporal substitution elasticity of labor supply
(measured across columns), the birth rate (measures across the rows of Table 3), and the
preference for diversity parameter (measured across the rows of Table 4).
As was argued in Section 3, the type of roots (real versus complex) varies with the
elasticity of labor supply, but also with other parameters. For a small θL and a small β
(and/or a small η), the steady state features two stable real roots. For very large values of
θL and η, the real parts of roots may turn positive, yielding an unstable solution. In many
instances of elastic labor supply, the stable (negative) roots are complex. In this case,




ν, as an appropriate measure of the speed of convergence. In case
of two stable (negative) real roots, the speed of convergence is a weighted average of these
roots. Asymptotically, the speed of adjustment is given by the larger of the two (negative)
roots.29 The speed of convergence for β = 0.05 and θL = 1.0 is 6.8 percent (Table 3),
which falls with the length of the planning horizon. The eﬀect of θL on the convergence
speed depends on the model speciﬁcation. In the standard OLG speciﬁcation of upward-
sloping individual consumption proﬁles (Table 3), a larger θL leads to faster convergence.
But, in the modiﬁed OLG model (Table 2) for β ∈ [0.05,0.10], a larger θL reduces the
convergence speed.
We ﬁrst turn to elastic labor supply for which a number of results stand out. First,
all long-run output multipliers are positive and increasing in θL.30 But, in the short run,
output multipliers are hump shaped in θL. Intuitively, at higher values of θL private
consumption falls less on impact, which depresses short-run labor supply (via the wealth
eﬀect) more and thus causes output to rise by less. For the benchmark value of θL = 2,
all long-run output multipliers (generating a stable outcome) are bigger than unity even if
goods markets are perfectly competitive. Low values of θL may generate long-run output
multipliers smaller than unity. Second, long-run output multipliers always exceed those
in the short run, a result which is also found by Heijdra and Ligthart (2007) in a closed
economy setting. Finally, for large substitution elasticities of labor supply we ﬁnd stable
spiralling relationships between consumption multipliers and output multipliers, yielding
alternating periods of positive and negative relationship.
For inelastic labor supply, impact and long-run output multipliers are zero, which
29Over time, the weight of the smaller (more negative) eigenvalue declines, implying that the larger (less
negative) root determines the asymptotic speed of convergence. See Alvarez-Cuadrado et al. (2004).
30Heijdra and Ligthart (2007) ﬁnd negative long-run output multipliers if the generational turnover
eﬀects dominates the labor supply eﬀect. In our case, capital accumulation does not aﬀect the rate of
interest in and out of steady state.
19demonstrates the crucial role the intertemporal labor supply eﬀect plays in generating non-
zero long-run output eﬀects. During transition, however, output rises, reﬂecting capital
formation induced by the rise in Tobin’s q on impact. The fall in the positive increment
in Tobin’s q together with capital depreciation, cause the capital stock and thus output
to fall back to its old equilibrium level.
Long-run output multipliers are unaﬀected by agents’ planning horizons (Table 3 for
β > 0), owing to the ﬁxed rate of interest, which pins down the capital-labor ratio and
thus the long-run marginal product of capital. The eﬀect of shorter planning horizons (i.e.,
a larger β) on short-run multipliers is negative at low values of θL, but shows a nonlinear
pattern for higher values of θL.
Turning to the diversity eﬀect, it can be seen from Table 4 that more diversity increases
long-run output multipliers, but has an ambiguous eﬀect on the size of short-run multipliers
if θL is small. In the benchmark scenario, a large η has a negative eﬀect on short-run
output multiplier. For η > 1/εL, labor demand is upward sloping. In this case, a shift
in the labor supply curve to the right reduces employment, which explains the negative
short-run output multiplier. Combinations of a large θL and η yield an unstable solution.
The ﬁrst row of the table is isomorphic to the perfectly competitive case (η = 1.0), which
yields a long-run output multiplier a little above unity in the benchmark scenario. Only
for small values of θL do we ﬁnd long-run output multipliers smaller than unity. In sum,
monopolistic competition increases the size of long-run output multipliers.
6 Conclusions
The paper has developed an OLG model for a small open economy with a view to analyze
the dynamic response of the macroeconomy to ﬁscal shocks. The OLG model is compared
with an RA model. Various instruments (lump-sum taxes and debt), duration of shocks
(temporary and permanent), and impulse sizes (moderate and drastic) are considered.
A number of key results can be extracted from the analysis. First, the sign of steady-
state output multipliers of ﬁscal policy shocks is robust to parameter changes (within the
parameter set generating a stable outcome), ﬁnancing method, and the size of ﬁscal im-
pulse. The size of output multipliers, however, is aﬀected by the ﬁnancing method and
alternative parameterizations. Bond-ﬁnanced long-run output multipliers are larger than
those found under lump-sum tax ﬁnancing. In the benchmark case, long-run output mul-
tipliers of permanent ﬁscal shocks exceed unity irrespective of the degree of monopolistic
competition or the ﬁnancing method. Smaller intertemporal elasticities of labor supply
reduce output multipliers, possibly below unity, whereas a higher degree of monopolistic
competition boosts output multipliers.
20Second, elastic intertemporal labor supply gives rise to endogenously determined cycles,
which increase in frequency with the size of the labor supply eﬀect. Because of this cyclical
feature, time periods with a negative association between private consumption multipliers
and output multipliers are followed by periods with a positive association.
Third, the size of lump-sum tax ﬁnanced output multipliers and the comparative dy-
namic properties of the OLG model diﬀer from those of an RA model, whereas the two
models generate very similar results in a closed-economy setting. For benchmark param-
eter values, the dynamics of a ﬁscal shock in an RA model imply a monotonic transition,
against cyclical adjustment in the OLG case. The RA model features a hysteretic steady
state, which is highly nonlinear, due to the ‘knife-edge condition’ (which prescribes a rate
of interest equal to the pure rate of time preference) and elastic intertemporal labor supply.
The diﬀerence in size between long-run output multipliers in the RA and OLG frameworks
rises with the intertemporal labor supply eﬀect. Consequently, the often assumed approx-
imate validity of RA models is tenuous in a small open economy environment.
Finally, temporary ﬁscal shocks have permanent output eﬀects if public spending is
ﬁnanced by government debt (or if planning horizons of agents are inﬁnite). Output
multipliers of permanent debt-ﬁnanced ﬁscal shocks are larger than that of temporary
debt-ﬁnanced shocks, particularly if the rise in public spending is combined with a cut in
initial lump-sum taxes.
There are of course many aspects of ﬁscal policy that have not been addressed here,
such as the output eﬀects of anticipated ﬁscal shocks and the optimal level of public
spending. In addition, the model could easily be extended to allow for money in utility
and sticky prices, which would provide a link with Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ’s Redux model.
We leave these extensions for further research.
21Appendix
A.1 Loglinearization
Loglinearizing the key expressions of the OLG model of Section 2 around an initial steady
state (assuming that B = F = 0 initially) yields Appendix Table 1. The following no-
tational conventions are employed. A tilde (˜) denotes a relative change, for example,
˜ C(t) ≡ dC(t)/C for most variables. Financial assets (i.e., A(t),B(t),F(t)), however,
are scaled by steady-state output and multiplied by r, for example, ˜ B(t) ≡ rdB(t)/Y .
Time derivatives are deﬁned as ˙ ˜ C(t) ≡ d ˙ C(t)/C, except for ﬁnancial assets, for example,
˙ ˜ B(t) ≡ rd ˙ B(t)/Y .
Conditional on the state variables and the policy shocks, the static part of the model
(given by (AT1.6)-(AT1.12)) can be condensed to the following quasi-reduced form ex-
pressions:
˜ Y (t) = ηφ(1 − εL) ˜ K(t) − (φ − 1) ˜ C(t), (A.1)
ηεL˜ L(t) = ˜ Y (t) − η(1 − εL) ˜ K(t), (A.2)
ηεL ˜ w(t) = (ηεL − 1)˜ Y (t) + η(1 − εL) ˜ K(t). (A.3)
A.2 Stability
Using (A.1)-(A.2) and the expressions in Appendix Table 1, the system can be written
as (20) in the main text, which is a four dimensional system of ﬁrst-order diﬀerential
equations for the physical capital stock, Tobin’s q, private consumption, and ﬁnancial








(1 − εL)(r − α)

ωG (φ − 1) + φχ(ωC − ωA)

> 0, (A.4)
where χ ≡ 1 − η(1 − εL) > 0 and det(∆) ≡ ν¯ νλ¯ λ, where ¯ ν and ¯ λ denote the roots of the
investment system (˜ q(t), ˜ K(t)) and ν and λ are the roots of the savings system ( ˜ C(t), ˜ A(t)).
The trace of ∆ is:
tr(∆) = ν + ¯ ν + λ + ¯ λ = 2(r∗ − h∗) = 3r − α > 0, (A.5)
where h∗ and r∗ are both positive. The system of four ﬁrst-order diﬀerential equations
gives rise to a characteristic polynomial of the fourth order:
h(s) ≡ |sI − ∆| = 0 ⇔ (s − ν)(s − ¯ ν)(s − λ)(s − ¯ λ) = 0, (A.6)
where the characteristic roots are in general terms:
ν ≡ −h∗ + θνi, ¯ ν ≡ −h∗ − θνi, λ ≡ r∗ + θλi, ¯ λ ≡ r∗ − θλi, (A.7)
22where an overbar denotes its complex conjugate and i is the imaginary unit. Recall that
the exponential form of any complex number is:
e(a±θki)t = eat [cosθkt ± isinθkt], (A.8)
where we have used Euler’s formula: eiθkt = cosθkt + isinθkt. It follows that the sign of
the real part of (A.8) (denoted by a) dictates stability.
For inelastic and moderately elastic labor supply, that is, 1 ≤ φ < ¯ φ ≡ 1/(η(1−εL)),31
it can be shown that the OLG system has a unique and saddle-path stable steady state.
The determinant of the investment system is given by:
|∆I| = −δ12δ21 < 0, (A.9)
and its trace tr(∆I) = δ22 = r > 0. Hence, it features a saddle-path equilibrium. The
˙ ˜ K(t) = 0 locus is horizontal and the ˙ ˜ q(t) = 0 locus is downward sloping in the (˜ q(t), ˜ K(t))
space. For φ = ¯ φ we get |∆I| = 0 and for φ > ¯ φ we ﬁnd |∆I| > 0. The savings system is
always saddle-path stable:
|∆S| = r(r − α)

1 −




where tr(∆S) = 2r − α > 0.
A.3 Solving the Model
The Laplace transform method of Judd (1982) is used to solve the model. By taking the




































(s − ν)(s − ¯ ν)(s − λ)(s − ¯ λ)
adjΛ(s), (A.12)
31For the special case of exogenous intertemporal labor supply (i.e., φ = 1 so that δ23 = 0), the investment
system decouples from the savings system so that it can be solved recursively.
23and rearranging we obtain the following expression in Laplace transforms:
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where ψ (s) and ϕ(s) are deﬁned as:
ψ (s) ≡ s(s − δ22) − δ12δ21,
ϕ(s) ≡ (s − δ33)(s − δ22) − δ34δ43,
which represent the characteristic equations of the investment system and savings system,
respectively.
A.4 Analytical Impulse Responses
This section derives analytical impulse response functions of ﬁscal shocks. The formulas
presented, cover the case of stable complex roots, which is generated by the benchmark
parameter values. We can easily show that the impact and long-run results are still valid
even if the stable roots are real and distinct (the unstable roots can be complex or real). In
that case, the transition terms diﬀer from those under complex roots because the cyclical
terms disappear. The details of the derivations can be found in Heijdra and Ligthart
(2006).
A.4.1 Impact Eﬀects
The jumps in ˜ C(0) and ˜ q (0) can be derived from (A.13). Because the rank of adjΛ(s)
equals 1 (for s = λ, ¯ λ) either row of the matrix can be used. Using the ﬁrst row of adjΛ(s),





















We ﬁrst study the investment system. The path for the capital stock is given in the main
text (see (28)), which is derived by taking the inverse Laplace transform of the ﬁrst row
of (A.13). Similarly, we can derive the path for Tobin’s q:
˜ q (t) = ˜ q (0)T2 (h∗,θν,t)
+
h 
λ + ¯ λ − δ22 − δ33







 ¯ λ + ξT
A(h∗,ξT,θν,t), (A.15)
where the general transition term, A(h∗,ξT,θν,t), and the ﬁrst temporary transition
term, T1 (h∗,θν,t), are given in the main text and the second temporary transition term
is deﬁned as:
Deﬁnition 3 The temporary transition term T2 (h∗,θν,t):








which has properties: (i) T2 (h∗,θν,0) = 1; and (ii) limt→∞ T2 (h∗,θν,t) = 0,
We now turn to the savings system. The paths for private consumption and ﬁnancial
capital are:
˜ C (t) =
h
δ34ωA˜ q (0) +
 
λ + ¯ λ − 2δ22
 ˜ C (0)
i
T1 (h∗,θν,t) +





δ34 [ξT (ξT + δ22) − δ12δ21]rωGπ1
(λ + ξT)






λ + ¯ λ − δ22 − δ33

˜ q (0) + δ43 ˜ C (0) − rωG (π0 + π1)
i
T1 (h∗,θν,t)





(ξT + δ33)[δ12δ21 − ξT (ξT + δ22)]rωGπ1
(λ + ξT)
 ¯ λ + ξT
 A(h∗,ξT,θν,t). (A.17)
Note that equations (A.1)-(A.3) can be used to derive the transition paths for Y (t), L(t),
and w(t). The paths for B(t), F(t), and I(t), follow from (25), (AT1.12), and (AT1.8),
respectively.
25Appendix Table 1: The Loglinearized Model
˙ ˜ K(t) = ¯ yωI[˜ I(t) − ˜ K(t)] (AT1.1)
˙ ˜ q(t) = r˜ q(t) − (1 − εL) ¯ y

˜ Y (t) − ˜ K(t)

(AT1.2)
˙ ˜ C(t) = (r − α)
h
˜ C(t) − (1/ωA) ˜ A(t)
i
(AT1.3)
˙ ˜ A(t) = r
h
˜ A(t) + εL( ˜ w(t) + ˜ L(t)) − ωT ˜ T(t) − ωC ˜ C(t)
i
(AT1.4)
˙ ˜ B(t) = r
h
ωG ˜ G(t) + ˜ B(t) − ωT ˜ T(t)
i
(AT1.5)
˜ L(t) = ˜ Y (t) − ˜ w(t) (AT1.6)
˜ rK(t) = ˜ Y (t) − ˜ K(t) (AT1.7)
˜ q(t) = σ[˜ I(t) − ˜ K(t)] (AT1.8)
˜ L(t) = θL
h
˜ w(t) − ˜ C(t)
i
(AT1.9)
˜ Y (t) = η
h







˜ Y (t) = εL ˜ w(t) + (1 − εL)˜ rK(t) (AT1.11)
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